











Today the phone threats start up again in the most awful 
way. I am terrified to be so closely monitored … a single 
nod makes me shut my Facebook account … less than 
fifteen minutes after posting a comment I get a phone call 
from him … all these thoughts make me an even more 
nervous creature. So they will not come into contact with 
my extreme anxiety, I steer clear of my friends …1 
 
This quote is from Samar Yazbek and it describes her experience of 
living and working in Syria as a journalist in 2011. The actor exercising 
this form of coercive control is not an intimate partner, but an agency of 
the state. Yet this quote could be just as easily attributable to many of the 
descriptions given by survivors of domestic abuse of their relationships; 
where the abusive partners exerts power and control over the other, 
dictating how they might live their life, and ensuring subservience 
through fear. In many cases this abuse is psychological, and many 
victims do not see themselves as such. They either normalise this 
behaviour or simply do not recognise it. The violence they experience is 
intertwined with physical violence: isolation, degradation, mind-games, 
micro–regulation, monitoring and checking against an unpredictable and 
ever changing ‘rule book.’2 Yazbek’s description fits the scenario of 
someone in a controlling relationship with an abusive intimate partner, 
where the abuse takes the form of psychological bullying, which, is 
recognised as within the continuum of violence of domestic abuse. In 











This paper will explore how the concept of coercive control, which has 
been recognised in UK legislation as a criminal offence since 2015 and 
is currently used exclusively to describe a form of abuse within intimate 
partner relations, can be extended to help us understand the continuum of 
violence experienced by men and women in the Syrian conflict. The use 
of physical violence by the state in this conflict is well documented, as 
well as the state's systematic use of torture, imprisonment and rape. 
However, for post 2015 Syria, there is also a need to understand the way 
that the state and other ac-tors have employed a strategy of creating an 
atmosphere of fear alongside the physical acts of violence. This fear has 
formed part of the authoritarian regime’s mechanism of rule for decades 
and has been reinforced by the violent suppression of any dissent, but 
since the Syrian conflict erupted it has been used by the regime as a 
strategy of war. This paper therefore argues that the international can 
learn from the local in this particular context. 
 
The term ‘coercive control’ was developed by Evan Stark in his work 
Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women, first published in 2007. In 
December 2015, it became a criminal offence in UK law. Coercive 
control is currently, first and foremost, a ‘domestic’ crime in ‘domestic’ 
legislation. But while Stark developed this concept to describe dynamics 
in intimate partner relationships and he himself is skeptical about its 
wider utility, in his own work, he talks about the concept being one of 
‘entrapment’ and deprivation of liberty. He also compares the experience 
of coercive control to the experience of ‘capture crimes’ or of being held 
hostage and draws parallels with the experience of prisoners of war 
(POWs), both in terms of the be-haviour itself and the impact it has on 
the victim. So, within the existing concept as framed by its creator there 
are indications of synergies between the ‘domestic’ in a non-conflict 
situation and the behaviours of actors in war and the potential to stretch 
the definition beyond intimate partner violence. I want to explore the 
ways in which this can be applied to the experiences of those in the 
current Syrian conflict and how this concept can be used to help 
academics and policy makers to improve our understanding of the impact 
of conflict on people who are currently displaced or resettled, but also on 
those seeking to return to Syria in the future to rebuild the country. 
 
I will begin by setting out my own positionality and placing this paper in 
the context of my ongoing research. This is followed by a discussion of 
Stark's definition of coercive control and the process by which it became 





Seven Years of Research on the Syrian Conflict 
 
148 
the discipline of International Relations is emphasized, particularly as a 
way of improving our understanding of the experience of war. The 
discussion subsequently moves to an ex-amination of what international 
law says regarding ‘controlling be-haviour’ and the sorts of 
psychological violence that Stark describes and the difficulties of 
interpretation and enforcement. Finally, I apply this conceptual 
framework on the Syrian conflict to illustrate how the definition can be 
stretched, before bringing us back to the domestic environment to make 
a link between the two through the ‘Reclaim the Night’ movement. 
 
My primary concern is to explore the impact of the ‘fear’ of sexual 
violence in the Syrian conflict. Here, I share the view of Stark, that by 
focusing on other forms of violence, we are not seeking to diminish the 
importance or deny the fact of physical violence. In-stead, I intend to 
make the case that, in both the domestic and inter-national arenas of 
conflict, the fear of violence is a specific psychological weapon that is 
being deployed by agents and alongside a range of other physical tactics. 
The fear thus generated in this continuum of violence is so extreme that 
it prevents the individual from escaping from the relationship they have 
with their perpetrator and therefore they are trapped. This makes the 
behaviour they experience a crime of entrapment or liberty. A question 
asked of many survivors of domestic abuse, and of those claiming 
asylum, is ‘why did you not leave’? The point at which a person can flee 
from this violence, or the reason why they do not, can be entirely 
understood by the psychological grip they are trapped in, often 
unknowingly, and the culmination of years of controlling behaviour 
which is normalised. The point where this becomes intolerable is the 
point when the survivor chooses to leave; often harm against children or 
other parties provides the tipping point. The murder of children who had 
put anti Ba-shar slogans on the city walls of Daara in March 2011 is 
widely regarded as having acted as a similar catalyst for protest in Syria. 
 
The importance of understanding this element of the continuum of 
violence, is around the impact on liberty and freedom. The generation of 
the fear of an act of physical violence may have the same im-pact on a 
victim as if the physical act did occur. The effect of this on human 
behaviour, movement and decisions to flee or fight, is important in 
understanding what has happened to people in Syria. The sociologist Liz 
Kelly has studied the impact of sexual violence on survivors and 
concluded that a victim’s level of fear derives as much from her 










immediate threat of the perpetrator.3 Stark similarly states that in 
coercive control, the idea of physical harm planted in the victims’ mind 
can have more devastating effect than actual violence.’4 
 
It also helps to explain what people would need to see happen before 
Syria can be reconstructed and peace built. Miriam Cooke in her 2017 
book Dancing in Damascus describes meeting a leading Syrian 
intellectual: 
 
Like all Syrians I have met….[he]…is committed to imagining a new 
political system that will give each individual freedom, dignity and a 
clear understanding of what it means to be a real citizen.5 
 
Compare this to what a domestic abuse survivor says when questioned 
about what she wanted from her future: “A future free from fear, not 
having to look over my shoulder all the time, to be mentally and 
financially independent but most of all to stop feeling ashamed of who I 
am.”6 In understanding what is needed to support this ambition, there is 
scope to put in place the structures and strategies that allow this to be 
realised. What can be learnt from the domestic experience to help us to 
do this in a future Syria? 
 
The objective here is to demonstrate how coercive control is used to 
achieve the same outcomes as physical violence in conflict: sectarian 
violence, displacement of certain peoples and the restoration of 
authoritarianism in the face of uprising. And therefore, show how the 
psychological violence in conflict is like coercive control in that it is part 
of the weaponry at the disposal of the perpetrator, whether that is a 
husband or a boyfriend or an agent of the state or non-state actor, the 
outcome is the same. They achieve domination and control. The victim 
does what the perpetrator intends. 
 
My academic pursuits are only part of my ‘position’. In addition to being 
a PhD student, I am a Senior Civil Servant in the Home Office in the UK 
and I have 17 years’ experience of work in Immigration, Crime and 
Policing. Of relevance to this work, I was responsible for the UK 
Government’s 2010 strategy to end violence against women and girls and 
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as well as broader priorities around asylum support and integration. I am 
now Director of the Adverse Childhood Experiences Hub in Wales 
looking at how we support organisations to understand the impact of 
trauma in childhood and increase awareness of how to prevent it. 
 
A better understanding of the different experiences of violence in war 
will support the development of academic research and pro-vide some 
challenge to existing literature about how ‘psychological’ violence and 
the provocation of an emotional response has a place in International 
Relations (IR). This work will also contribute to a new developing strand 
of research in feminist IR that considers emotion and war. By including 
the voices of artists, authors and poets, I hope to demonstrate the 
importance of their work in helping us to under-stand what it feels like to 
experience conflict, and to push against the perception that fiction, for 
example, can be a source for IR theorists to examine. I hope that my 
research will also support those of us working on UK government 
policies to better support the integration of Refugees from conflict zones, 
in this case Syria. It will help us to ensure the right ‘domestic’ services 
are available to those who want or need them, but also build on our 
improved understanding of how coercive control impacts on people in 
the domestic sphere to support those we seek to help be part of our 
society. Drawing out the parallels of what the victims and survivors 
experience, may help us to do so. 
 
So, what exactly is ‘Coercive Control’? According to Stark, it may be 
defined as follows: 
 
an ongoing pattern of domination by which male abusive partners 
primarily interweave repeated physical and sexual violence with 
intimidation, sexual degradation, isolation and control. The primary 
outcome of coercive control is a condition of entrapment that can be 
hostage-like in the harms it inflicts on dignity, liberty, autonomy and 
personhood as well as to physical and psychological integrity.7 
 
An important aspect of coercive control is its gendered nature. Stark is 











it is used to secure male privilege, and its regime of 
domination/subordination is constructed around the enforcement of 
stereotypes. ‘Domination’ here refers to both the power/privilege exerted 
through coercive control in individual relations and to the political power 
created when men as a group use their oppressive tactics to reinforce 
persistent sexual inequalities in the larger society.8 
 
In 2015, eight years after his work on coercive control was published, 
Stark was appointed as an expert advisor to the UK Government as it 
decided to make coercive control a criminal offence. This represented a 
fundamental shift in UK policy. In 2010, the publication of the strategy 
to end violence against women and girls in the UK was celebrated by the 
leading organisations which campaign for the rights of women, victims 
and survivors of domestic abuse, for bringing together all forms of 
gender-based violence in a single strategy; something they had been 
demanding for 30 years. Significantly, this strategy barely mentions 
coercive control. This situation has changed over the preceding years, 
and changes of government. And as the focus changed to become more 
criminal justice orientated, there was a move by the sector to push for a 
specific offence to recognise coercive control as a form of violence 
within the continuum of violence in the domestic space. It recognises the 
harm caused by coercion or control, and that the cumulative impact on 
the victim and a repeated pattern of abuse can be more injurious and 
harmful than a single incident of violence.9 This is an important context 
to under-stand for this paper, as although the UK government has 
recognised domestic violence and all forms of violence against women 
and girls for many years, the criminal offence of coercive control is 
relatively new and somewhat controversial. The difficulty prosecutors 
and the police face in getting convictions for this form of violence even 
where there is physical evidence has brought into question whether 
convictions could be secured for something that is even more difficult to 
‘prove’. Despite this concern, however, what the offence has done is 
helped highlight the fact that abuse is not just a physical at-tack, and the 
impact of these other forms of violence are part of the whole picture of 
abuse. If we understand this, we can provide the right support. This is a 
similar situation to the international setting, where it is clearly difficult 
to get justice at the state level for physical acts of violence let alone 
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In December 2015, the new offence came into force in the UK. The 
accompanying statutory guidance provides the UK cross-government 
definition on which the offence is based as: 
 
Controlling behaviour is: a range of acts designed to make a person 
subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, 
exploiting their re-sources and capacities for personal gain, depriving 
them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and 
regulating their everyday behaviour. 
 
Coercive behaviour is: a continuing act or a pattern of acts of assault, 
threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, 
punish, or frighten their victim.10 
 
Taken on its own, without an accompanying explanation around this 
being in the context of ‘intimate partner’ violence or what we understand 
as the domestic setting, it seems as though that this definition could also 
describe the experience of those living in the shad-ow of the shabbiha or 
secret police in Syria, as described by Yazbek at the start of this paper 
(further explored below). The statutory guidance also sets out a set of 













Coercive Control and ‘capture crimes’ – there is already a link  
 
One of the central positions of the concept of coercive control is its 
clearly articulated link to other capture or ‘liberty crimes’ where a person 
experiences a deprivation of his/her liberty, such as those detained as 
hostages, prisoners of war and torture victims. Stark argues that coercive 
control resembles the violence used in capture crimes in three main ways: 
it is designed to punish, hurt or control a victim; its effects are cumulative 
rather than incident specific; and it frequently results in severe injury or 
death.11 From the perspective of a victim of coercive control, Linda 
Gordon describes her ‘capture’ as being a ‘battered woman’s socially 
constructed inability to escape.’12 Or that it is the ‘victim’s agency that is 
the principal target.’13 The whole idea of coercive control is to create an 
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of a generic conformity to authority as might be expected from a hostage, 
prisoners or those detained under the mental health act, it is destined to 
enforce a per-son’s obedience, where an individual exerts power that 
forces another to conform to what they want them to do.14 
 
The World Organisation Against Torture draws a parallel be-tween the 
context of a victim of torture by a state official, and a domestic victim of 
coercive control. The torture by a state official typically takes place when 
the victim is in incommunicado detention, at the unsupervised mercy of 
his interrogators or captors and without access to the outside world. 
Battered women, because of their domes-tic situation live isolated of 
family and friends and others who might support them. 15Victims of 
coercive control are effectively ‘hostages at home’ suggesting abuse is a 
political crime like terrorism.16 In his work, Stark also considers the 
terms used by other sociologists to try to categorise this sort of violence. 
They are an interesting mix of words that bring together the ‘domestic’ 
and what we might term more ‘international’ phraseology, particularly in 
the current uses of the word. Stark describes how we have moved, in the 
domestic sphere, from an emphasis on ‘repeated assault’ to an 
understanding that abuse is a continuous process that includes structural 
elements and has cumulative effects. He gives an example of this work 
in the shift made by sociologist Michael Johnson, who in recognition of 
this relationship, renamed his categories of violence to ‘situational 
violence’ and ‘intimate terrorism.’17 
 
This signals not only a shift to the structural understanding, but also an 
example of how definitional stretching can be achieved; and a clear link 
to what we are seeing in modern conflicts such as Syria where there are 
many actors ranging from the state, to individual military leaders, 
opposition fighters and actors such as Daesh (whom we would term 
commonly as terrorists). The distinction between ‘situational violence’ 
i.e. conflict where violence is used, and intimate terrorism is helpful as it 
brings into scope the possibility of discussing the coercive and 
controlling tactics used that are not covered by ‘fighting’ for example. 
 
I had the privilege to spend some time with Stark during his re-cent visit 
to the UK and took the opportunity to ask him directly what he thought 
about the concept of definitional stretching to include the behaviour of 
actors in conflict, particularly around the threat of sexual violence. His 










is mentioned by Michael Johnson, that perhaps what I was describing 
was ‘sexual terrorism.’ Where he thought there was a difference, 
however, was in the impact on and coping strategies employed by 
victims. In his view, refugees are more resilient, and their main concern 
is not whether they themselves will be assaulted but rather with keeping 
their children safe from the ‘situational’ violence and finding a way to 
make new lives for them. 
 
This is not a mistaken conclusion; but Stark admits to not having 
interviewed asylum seekers or refugees; I would suggest that this 
assumption is based on what others have related to him. Having 
interviewed many people in this situation, I have observed that they will 
say to officials that the safety and education of their children is the most 
important aspect for them; but they are often hiding the im-pact their 
experience has had on their own health or their own needs. It is often 
further down the line, when safety and education is se-cured, that the 
wider impact of their experience is realised. And even then, through 
reasons of fear, or from the normalising of their experience, they are 
unable to articulate what has happened to them. For example, the inherent 
fear and distrust of authority, is a barrier to discussing anything that may 
appear critical of their political experience for fear of informants. So 
much so that often refugees prefer to use Arabic speaking, rather than 
Syrian, translators. Also, it may only be after living outside of the 
geographical region and having an experience of different societal or 
cultural norms that refugees from Syria realise that behaviour that they 
have taken for granted is not ‘nor-mal’. The impact of this realisation 
may manifest in mental health or behavioural problems which carry a 
stigma in all societies; the challenges of asking for this help already exists 
and to link cause and effect perhaps years later. 
 
I asked the same question about the potential for definitional stretch 
relating to coercive control of Gill Hague, at Bristol University, who set 
up the Violence Against Women Research Group. She saw scope in 
looking at definitional stretching, but urged caution, stating that we 
should be looking at this in ‘baby-steps’. The time it has taken to get an 
understanding of coercive control, and what it means in a very limited 
number of Western schools of thought will mean that the challenge of 
broadening it may be a step too far too quickly. She felt that there was 
much more to do to improve under-standing of Violence Against Women 
and also felt that it may not be the right time to introduce something else 
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point of view rather than whether this is something that should be looked 
at academically, which she supported. Nazand Begikhani, who is an 
expert of violence against women in Kurdish Iraq, signaled that she 
thought that this type of violence (psychological, mental) was already in 
international law, and that it had been recognised at an international level. 
She was unsure what more was required. 
 
There has been some work in recent years that does already make the 
connection between ‘negative experiences’ and the impact on children, 
that does explore the impact of psychological violence. In Wales and 
Scotland, there has been more of a public health focus on ‘adverse 
childhood experiences’ (ACES). By framing the issue of the impact of 
negative experience, whether that be of conflict and living in a war zone 
and all that is witnessed there, as a health issue there is scope to explore 
the psychological impact of coercively con-trolling behaviours in conflict 
as part of the wider understanding of conflict. Public Health Wales 
recently published ‘Preventing Violence, Promoting Peace – A policy 
tool kit for addressing interpersonal, collective and extremist violence’. 
The report talks about the impact of distinct forms of violence but also 
introduces the concept of ‘life course’ violence: 
 
‘Acute impacts of violence (i.e. in the immediate aftermath of victim-
isation) include significant physical injury, disability and death. 
Globally, interpersonal and collective violence are estimated to have 
caused around 580,000 deaths and more than 33 million years of healthy 
life lost in 2015. From a life course perspective, violence and other 
adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) can impair social and emotional 
development, limit individuals’ life opportunities and result in early 
death …’18 
 
There is clearly an interest and scope to include coercive control in 
conflict as a form of violence, and ACE, that could fall into further 
research in the public health space. This is also supported by the re-port 
by Save the Children in its 2017 report ‘Invisible Wounds’ where the 
impact of the experience of war manifests itself as ‘toxic stress. These 
experiences include the daily fear of death in conflict but also the impact 
of witnessing and experiencing a combination of things such as loss of 
education or feelings of grief. At six years old, this is the only life many 











I will now turn to the question posed by Dr Begikhani; what is there in 
International Law and international statutes and conventions that 
supports the assertion that coercive control, or at least recognised 
elements of it, are already ‘offences’? 
 
What does International Law state? 
 
In seeking to understand the extent to which the ideas contained within 
coercive control are already incorporated within international law, it is 
useful to start with the Geneva Convention, particularly the fourth 
Convention (1949) which includes: 
 
- violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
- taking of hostages 
- outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment 
 
Although the Convention references torture and degrading treatment, it 
is not explicit that this should include coercive control. In many cases the 
victim does not see themselves as such, until it is too late and other forms 
of physical violence have caused physical harm or even death. If a 
behaviour is not yet recognised for the harm it causes, then it is unlikely 
to be picked up in such a broad definition. For example, in domestic 
legislation the reason it is an explicit offence is to ensure that we 
understand that this behaviour is not acceptable. Without it, it is unclear 
whether it would be considered and what threshold would need to be 
reached. 
 
For more recent developments, I have looked in detail at the 
‘International Protocol on the Documentation and investigation of Sexual 
Violence in Conflict’, which came out of the 2014 Global Summit to End 
Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Protocol itself includes reference to the 
psychological repercussions of sexual violence for survivors and 
witnesses, and a reference to the gender-based nature of it and the 
prevalence against children. Similar to the argument that Stark makes 
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that “historical and structural inequalities that exist between men and 
women, and the different forms of gender-based discrimination that 
women are subjected to all over the world, contribute to the women and 
girls being disproportionately affected by sexual violence in conflict 
setting.”19 The protocol help-fully goes on to recognise that sexual 
violence as a crime under international law is often committed as part of 
a broad pattern of violations against individuals and communities, that 
includes sexual and non-sexual crimes.20 So here we have a recognition, 
in addition to what we know is a crime under international law, that there 
is a broader set of ‘behaviours’ that seem to reflect at least in part the 
definition of coercive control as an ‘ongoing pattern’. What needs to be 
explored further, however, is what is included in this list of ‘violations’, 
and how does it compare to the language used in the coercive control 
descriptions and types of behaviour. 
 
The protocol is cautious when discussing what may already be in statute 
and states that in certain circumstances, sexual violence constitutes a 
crime under international law; a war crime, a crime against humanity and 
/or an act of genocide and can be investigated and prosecuted at both the 
national and international levels. Therefore, we need to look at the 
interpretation of international law and how it is enforced to see where 
these circumstances are, and where in these ‘crimes’ there is scope to 
include the ‘broader pattern.’ First there is the context of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and ad hoc tribunals. 
This was then codified and advanced in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and then advanced again by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leo-ne (SCSL). 
 
The protocol makes clear that although it has a focus on the provisions 
set out in the Rome Statute, many of them have not yet been litigated or 
resolved. It points out that jurisprudence of the ad hoc and hybrid 
tribunals, such as the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia 
and the SCSL may provide the only available guidance.21 However, what 
is of interest here is whether there is any-thing in existing international 
law that reflects the coercive control concept, so the Rome statute seems 
a sensible place to start. If we consider what is contained under the 
heading of War Crimes (article 8.2), Crimes Against Humanity (Article 
7) and Genocide (article 6) there are some elements that may be useful. 
Under Article 8.2 (B and c), there is specific reference to ‘Committing 










treatment’ in 8.2 (c-13 there is also ‘Violence to life and person, in 
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and 
intentional starvation and deprivation of objects indispensable to 
survival.’ Crimes against humanity (Article 7) lists four areas of specific 
interest: Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, and enforced 
dis-appearance of persons and ‘other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health.’22 
 
A thorough examination of the details of the Rome Statute and its 
interpretation are outside the scope of this study. An examination of 
interpretation of guidelines, however, is needed to determine where there 
may be opportunities to use this legislation to include psychological 
violence. At a high level, it appears that there is reference to the sorts of 
behaviours that are synonymous with some of those identified in 
domestic legislation. What is important about the Rome Statute is that it 
covers individuals acting within the state, not just the state itself. And, 
crimes against humanity can apply in the absence of a formal conflict. 
But initial work of the ICC, established by the Rome Statute has shown 
that it is easier to prosecute under some categories than it is others, for 
example, in terms of the evidence that might be available and whether 
the acts committed were behind closed doors or a mass publicly 
witnessed atrocity classified as genocide. In the case of the more public 
events it is still difficult, but perhaps less difficult to prosecute them for 
the activity that takes place out of the public space. The evidence point 
is helpful; and one faced in the enforcement of the domestic legislation 
on coercive control. But there are instances where victims of this form of 
abuse have been able to provide evidence, most famously on one of 
Stark’s cases, keeping a notebook of daily tasks, which was compelling 
evidence of the domination and control that the victim was being 
subjected to. But leaving the difficulty of evidencing the crime to one 
side for the moment, it is instructive to return to the argument put forward 
by the World Organisation Against Torture. Because in our attempt to 
find something applicable in international law, it is important to consider 
what the Rome statute gives us in terms of torture, even if trying to 
prosecute for this may be a more difficult route. 
 
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cru-el, 










For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” means any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a per-son for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental 
to lawful sanctions.23 
 
What is interesting about this definition is that it clearly identifies that 
perpetrators of torture are either a public official or conducting their 
activity with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or someone 
acting in that capacity. That would not necessarily cover the range of 
actors in conflict who may be perpetrators of behaviour that an 
international definition of coercive control might apply to. For example, 
in the Syrian conflict it would cover the state actors and secret police and 
the tactics they employ; it would not pick up those labelled ‘rebels’ or 
actors such as Daesh, or indeed groups or gangs who do not wear any 
identifying insignia. Turning again to the Rome Statute, the definition of 
torture in Article 7.2(e) says: 
 
“Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the 
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions;24 
 
This seems to provide a more encompassing definition that may be 
helpful to try to make a comparison on the behaviours listed in domestic 
legislation. However, to be able to take any action under Article 7 or 
where torture is listed as a war crime of genocide, the perpetrator must 
be a national of a state party to the Rome Statute, the alleged crime took 
place on the territory of a state party, or a situation is referred to the court 
by the United Nations Security Council. In the case of Syria, it seems 











International law at the moment does recognise, at a high level, the 
impact of psychological torture and whilst this is helpful, what it does not 
do is recognise the cumulative effect of controlling or coercive behaviour 
or provide clarity to those who enforce it, as to what behaviours constitute 
an offence. The testing of the existing law is essential to understanding 
what is needed, and it is still easier to do this through publicly witnessed 
acts of physical violence. 
 
Coercive Control in the Syrian Conflict 
 
The conflict in Syria provides a very current example of an international 
application for the concept of coercive control. Stark describes coercive 
control as being so extensive and penetrating that there is a sense of 
‘omnipresence.’25 He also refers to the ‘injection of high levels of fear 
into the ordinary round of everyday life’26 and the devastating 
psychological effects of isolation; the incapacity to ‘not know what you 
know’ or what he terms as ‘perspecticide’27 where the perspective of 
what is right or wrong is taken away. All this is recognisable in the 
documented experiences of Syrians as the Arab Spring took place in 
2011, and the country descended into war. But elements of it can also be 
found prior to that. 
 
Three examples of literature that illustrate these very aspects in relation 
to Syria are examined here. The first example is the work of Nihad Sirees 
who describes in his ‘semi fictional’ book ‘The Silence and the Roar’ the 
sense of an ‘all seeing’ omnipresent government, which forces all 
citizens to carry identification and does spot checks, and coerces the 
people (described as masses) to take part in marches to celebrate their 
leader. He describes in detail the sense of fear and his isolation as a 
journalist. His experience at the hands of the secret police, whom he 
describes as ‘military security goons’, and the time he spends dodging 
them, demonstrates the power that they wield. Power in this case is 
created by the threat of physical violence if he failed to comply with their 
demands to work for them in the propaganda machine. He does not 
experience any physical violence until later in the book, but his 
understanding that physical violence will be a consequence of an arrest 
is clear. He describes the actions of the secret police towards a man in 
charge of the photocopying of posters of the leader, which became 
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mother, under duress to a prominent minister, to force him to comply 
with the request to work in the communications department rather than 
continue as a journalist.28 But most interesting of all is the author’s 
description of the society in which he lives, which echoes the language 
in Stark’s description of the domestic perpetrator of coercive control: 
 
People must not think about the leader and how he runs the country; they 
must simply adore him, want to die for him in their adoration of him, 
Therefore the leader creates a roar all around him, forcing people to 
celebrate him, to roar … people are coerced into the streets in order to 
chant … the leader seeking to cove himself with a roaring halo….as a 
means of covering up and suppressing any other sound. With this roar, 
he aims to cover up violent crimes he unleashed against his rivals in the 
underground dungeons of the security apparatus, those places located far 
out of sight but which everyone knows about.29 
 
The other two examples can be found is the works of two female 
journalists in Syria, both now resident in France: Janine Di Giovanni and 
Samar Yazbek. Notwithstanding the risks associated with journalism in 
a conflict zone anyway, both describe life in Syria as one as predicated 
on fear, dominance and control. Janine Di Giovanni describes instances 
of psychological pressure, where there is a fear of a family member being 
raped. This concurs with a recognition in the statement ahead of the 2014 
Global Summit on Sexual Violence which called for recognition for such 
acts as psychological torture, stating, ‘…we must also recognise that men 
and boys are victims of this crime, as are those who are forced to witness 
or perpetrate this violence against their family or community members.’30 
In Dispatches From Syria: the Morning they Came For Us, Di Giovanni 
provides a voice for Syrian women in particular. One describes the 
specific tactics of the Shabbiha, or secret police acting for the regime 
(which translates as ghosts). 
 
Their tactics were largely to incite fear within communities; to enter 
towns and villages after the government troops had been fighting nearby, 
and spread the word that that they would rape the women… daughters, 
mothers, cousin, nieces. It’s a convenient way to ethnically cleanse an 











In ‘A woman in the Cross Fire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution’, Samar 
Yazbek describes, in similar terms again to Stark’s de-scription of how a 
perpetrator creates ‘the injection of fear into everyday life’, and how it 
has become normalised. She describes how “…without realising it people 
subsist on fear, which has become as automatic as breathing.”32 She 
describes the omnipresence of the security forces who are described as 
“sprouted out of the ground” and how the ‘earth split open with [them].’33 
Stark also talks about surveillance and monitoring as being a key part of 
the continuum of violence and likens it to tactics used to intimidate 
Prisoners of War or hostages, but in Yazbek’s work we can similarly see 
a comparison to her situation as a journalist being controlled by the secret 
police. In the same way, the intention is to ensure omnipresence and 
enforcing behaviours; as Stark describes it, letting the victim know she 
is being watched or overheard, which cause isolation both of the victim 
and by the victim. Yazbek endures cycles of violence, detention, 
intimidation, threats both physical and sexual, and threats against her 




My objective was to demonstrate a need to better understand the im-pact 
of coercive control in the international space, not only as a weapon or 
war, but also as a means to govern a nation, or to incite violence or 
behaviours that are desired to further the aims of those in, or exercising 
power over others. If we understand that connection between acts of 
violence associated with the domestic space, and how those same 
behaviours form part of a continuum of violence in conflict that is more 
than the ‘situational violence’ that Johnson de-scribes. 
 
Syrian writers often talk about the fabric of Syrian society, and how that 
has been destroyed; I do not think that Stark’s offer of ‘sexual terrorism’ 
as a descriptor for this is the right terminology; but the use of the word 
terrorism does describe the impact of this violence. It is intimate; there is 
a relationship between the perpetrator and the victim that is different to 
that of a perpetrator of random acts of violence. There is also a 
continuum, and I would argue a mechanism that held the fabric of society 
together when required, but also when a tipping point is reached, 
provokes an action and reaction that has destroyed a country. In intimate 
partner violence, the relationship can continue for years, until something 
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Having looked at both ‘situations’, what differentiates the two is less 
clear to me at this stage than it was when I started. 
 
However, in discussing the ‘sexual terrorism’ concept, Ann Flitcraft 
offered another insight which I will conclude this paper with. I talked 
about women in conflict living in constant fear; she reminded me of the 
reason behind the formation of the ‘Reclaim the Night’ movement in the 
UK. Liz Kelly visited Leeds at the time when the Yorkshire Ripper was 
committing his crimes against women in the city. She describes how she 
‘sensed an atmosphere of fear amongst women…83 percent of women 
restricted their move-ments’34. For her, this increased her awareness of 
how strong the fear of attack can be and the enormous effect it has on 
freedom.’35 The Reclaim the Night marches were a response to that loss 
of freedom, and anger at the seemingly slow response of the police, and 
differential treatment of the female student victims over the prostitutes. 
The result was a series of coordinated marches across the UK in 
opposition to the police advice of the time that women should stay 
indoors and not go out at night unless accompanied by a man. Women 
took to the streets en masse with flaming torches. We see this act of 
defiance when women are able to leave abusive relationships, or even 
when they are forced to kill their abuser. We also saw it in the defiance 
and protest marches against the regime in Syria in the spring of 2011 and 
the foundation of movements like ‘Syrian Women in Sup-port of the 
Uprising’. Time will tell whether Syrian women will be able to reclaim 
their lives, not just the night, and whether a specific offence of coercive 
control will ensure women in the domestic sphere can do the same. If 
they can, then those principles of freedom, dignity and a sense of identity 
are the cornerstones of a society, including post conflict Syria, that must 
be in place for the future. 
_______________________________ 
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